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Abstract
We provide some objective foundations for a belief revision process in a situation
where (i) the decision-maker’s initial probabilistic knowledge is imprecise and charac-
terized by the core of a belief function, (ii) expected new data are themselves consistent
with a belief function with known focal sets and (iii) the revision process is based on
belief function combination. We study the properties of the information value for such a
revising in the Gilboa–Schmeidler multi-prior model. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who knows that he will improve
his imprecise statistical knowledge by getting some new data. This improve-
ment will enable him to reduce the ambiguity he faces. In other words if his
initial knowledge consists of a family of probability distributions, then the new
data will conduct him to revise his belief and replace this family by a smaller
one. This work is closely linked to [2] where a notion of information structure
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based on the idea of ambiguity being reduced is defined, and where the in-
formation value of such a process is obtained by considering the Gilboa–
Schmeidler [6] Max Min Expected Utility Model. However, while in [2] the
consistency of the subjective anticipations of the decision-maker about the
future reduction in ambiguity was studied, no objective foundations for this
process was proposed. The purpose of the present paper is to oer such an
objective explanation.
The idea is the following. Initially, the decision-maker is endowed with a
belief function f and considers as possible the family of probability distribu-
tions which lie in the core of f. The new statistical data he is going to receive is a
belief function g compatible with f. Given this new belief function g, the de-
cision-maker will combine his initial family coref  with the new family coreg
and restrict his attention to coref  \ coreg since the statistical reality, i.e, the
true probability distribution, necessarily belongs to the two families. The de-
cision-maker does not know in advance which belief function he will receive.
Indeed, were we to assume the contrary, he could already revise his knowledge.
Yet, throughout this paper, we make the central assumption that the decision-
maker knows the possible focal events of the future belief function. Thus he
anticipates that he can receive any belief function g with focal events in a given
set, which is compatible with f i.e. such that coref  \ coreg 6 ;: The fol-
lowing two examples aim at illustrating our purpose.
Example 1.1 (Adapted from [8]). Assume that a poll institute 1 organizes a study
on how a representative sample will vote for a next election in two months. Let
S  fa; b; c; d; eg be the set of candidates. Voters’ opinions, today, are not
firmly established, so voters are authorized to point only a subset A of S that
contains the name of the candidate they will vote for. (In order to avoid un-
necessary technical complications, we assume that A must be non-empty.)
Therefore institute 1 will get a belief function f, with the help of the induced
objective proportions mA for any A belonging to 2S :
Suppose now that institute 1 learns that a few days before the actual vote,
the results of a new survey performed on a similar representative sample by a
poll institute 2 will be published, where the voters will be asked whether they
will vote for a candidate in a given non-empty coalition B 2 2S or in the op-
posite non-empty coalition B: (For the same reasons as above, we assume that
the choice of B or B is compulsory.) Then institute 1 faces a kind of situation
investigated in this paper, since it only knows the possible focal elements (here
B or B ) of the future belief function g, and clearly the assumption of repre-
sentative samples guarantees the compatibility of f and g.
In Example 1.2 we consider a more general situation in the sense that the
future possible focal elements will no longer form a partition of the set S of
states of nature.
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Example 1.2 (Adapted from [7]). Let us consider a population of patients, each
patient being in one of four exclusive states of health: H  healthy,
D1  to suffer from disease 1, Dÿ2  to suffer from a mild form of disease 2,
D2  to suffer from a serious form of disease 2. Only medical tests permit to
detect the health’s states. A first medical test was applied which permits to
detect with certainty D1; i.e.: T1  fD1g (if the test’s result is positive) and
Tÿ1  fH ;Dÿ2 ;D2 g: 30% of the population react positively. Thus
pfD1g  30% and p H ;Dÿ2 ;D2
 	ÿ   70% are the only probability we know
precisely. Assume that a new medical test is now available with
T2  D1;Dÿ2 ;D2
 	
(a positive results means that you are ill) and
Tÿ2  H ;Dÿ2
 	
(for Dÿ2 the test’s result can be either positive or negative).
Unfortunately, because of anonymity constraint, it is not possible to combine
the two test’s results for each patient. Given this constraint, should we make
test T2? Yes because nevertheless we can expect a reduction of our ambiguity by
combining the two test’s results over the population. We will observe x% of T2
and given test T1’s results, necessarily x% P 30%: From observation x%; we
deduce then that pfDÿ2 ;D2 gP xÿ 0:3 and pfH ;Dÿ2 gP 1ÿ x:
Let us mention that dealing here only with belief functions (instead of, say,
with convex capacities) presents several advantages. First it fits with numerous
practical situations of imprecise but exact data. Second it considerably facili-
tates the derivation of clear-cut results essentially through the non-negativity of
the Mobius inverse and the resulting simple description of the core of such
capacities, a well-known result since Dempster’s seminal paper [5].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set the framework of the
process we consider. In Section 3 we define the value of information. In Section
4 we study the consistency requirement for these ‘‘Ambiguity Reducing
Structures’’. In Section 5, we compare structures in terms of informativeness.
2. Definition of the ambiguity reducing structures
We consider S a finite set of states of the world and 2S the algebra of events
of S. The decision-maker has an initial statistical knowledge coref  with f a
belief function defined on 2S and mf its Mobius transform.
Definition 2.1. Two belief functions f and g on 2S are said to be compatible if
coref  \ coreg 6 ;:
Since the decision-maker is concerned with the real underlying probability
distribution and since we suppose that the statistical data he receives is only
imprecise but never wrong (i.e. the real underlying statistical situation always
belongs to the family of probability distribution that sums up the knowledge of
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the decision-maker), we only restrict our attention to belief functions which are
compatible. (For an extensive study of the combination of two compatible
belief functions, see [4].)
Definition 2.2. We call Suppf  the smallest (for set inclusion) E  S such that
f E  1.
For a belief function, there is no problem of existence and uniqueness of
such an event.
Definition 2.3. We denote Uf   fE  S=mf E > 0g the set of focal events for
the belief function f :
Obviously we have that Suppf   SE2Uf  E.
Let us consider R  2S .
Definition 2.4. We denote BF R the set of belief functions g such that
Ug  R:
From now on we assume that the decision-maker knows that the focal
events of the belief function g he will receive will all belong to R:
Definition 2.5. We denote BF R; f  the set of belief functions in BF R which
are compatible with f.
This definition also stands for probability distributions. In that case, we
have BF R; p  fg 2 BF R=p 2 coregg:
As pointed out in Section 1, the following lemma, a central result of
Dempster [5] (see also a generalization in [3] to general capacities), will be of
great help in several proofs below.
Lemma 2.1. Let f be a belief function on S; 2S with Mobius inverse mf and Uf 
as set of focal elements, and let p be a probability measure on S; 2S. Then, the
following propositions are equivalent:
(i) p P f :
(ii) There exists a mapping a : S  2S ! R such that
(a) as;A > 0) s 2 A;
(b)
P
s2A as;A  1; 8A 2 2S ;
(c) pfsg PA22S ;Afsg as;A  mf A; 8s 2 S:
(iii) The same proposition as (ii) with Uf  instead of 2S.
It is also the case for the following lemma due to [4].
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Lemma 2.2. Let f and g be two belief functions, then the following two assertions
are equivalent:
(i) The belief functions f and g are compatible.
(ii) There exists a mapping b : 2S  2S ! R such that:
(a) bE; F  > 0) E  F 2 Uf   Ug and E \ F  ; ) bE; F   0;
(b) mf E 
P
F2Ug bE; F  and mgF  
P
E2Uf  bE; F :
Let us add that, due to space constraints, we have only tried to emphasize
the main points of the proofs of the results below, without always developing
all details.
Proposition 2.1. For all belief functions f and sets R




Proof. Obvious (remind that g 2 BF R; f  i 9p 2 coref  \ coreg and
g 2 BF R). 
In terms of anticipations, this means that the belief functions g the decision-
maker believes possible given f and R are the belief functions that he believes
possible to receive given R and a possible underlying probability distribution p.
Proposition 2.2. For all belief functions f, sets R and g 2 BF R; f ;
coref  \ coreg  fp 2 coref =g 2 BF R; pg.
Proof. Obvious (this result is a mere restatement of Definitions 1 and 5). 
Let us study now the decision-maker’s anticipations about how he will revise
his knowledge.
Definition 2.6. We denote respectively Ff  and Ff ; g the family of prob-
ability distributions in coref  and coref  \ coreg.
Necessarily Ff ; g Ff  which can be interpreted as a reduction of
ambiguity. 1
Given f and R, a decision-maker can anticipate how his beliefs may evolve
after he will get new data.
Definition 2.7. We call the set f  R  fFf ; g=g 2 BF R; f g an Ambiguity
Reducing Structure.
1 Ff ; g is what corresponds to the ‘‘revising message’’ considered in [2].
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By definition, any Ff ; g in f  R is not ;.
Proposition 2.3. Let p be given in Ff ; then there exists at least a
Ff ; g 2 f  R such that p 2Ff ; g if and only if BF R; p 6 ;:
Proof. Obvious since for any p 2Ff ; p 2Ff ; g () g 2 BF R; p: 
If there is no such Ff ; g 2 f  R; this means that the decision-maker an-
ticipates that he will no longer consider pas possible whatever the data he re-
ceives.
Definition 2.8. For any R  2S and E 2 2S, we denote RE 
fF 2 2S=F  H \ E with H 2 Rg:
The next proposition gives the condition which ensures that the decision-
maker can make some anticipations.
Proposition 2.4. The two propositions are equivalent
(i) BF R; f  6 ;;
(ii) 8E 2 Uf ; RE 6 f;g:
Proof. (i)) (ii). We show the implication by proving that if (ii) does not stand,
then it is also the case for (i). Thus take an E 2 Uf  such that RE  f;g: It
implies that 8g 2 BF R; 8p 2 coreg; pE  0 while 8p 2Ff ; pEP
mf E > 0. So BF R; f   ;:
(ii) ) (i). If (ii) is true, then there exists a function u : Uf  ! R such
that 8E 2 Uf ; E \ uE 6 ;: Define gu 2 BF R by mguF  P
E2Uf =uEF mf E: One can check that gu 2 BF R; f : 
Since in this paper we assume that BF R; f  is non-empty, the above
condition (ii) holds throughout the paper.
The following proposition shows an important consistency condition about
the decision-maker’s anticipations.
Proposition 2.5. The two propositions are equivalent
(i) For all p 2Ff ; BF R; p 6 ;;
(ii)
S
E2RSuppf  E  Suppf :
Proof. (i) ) (ii). Let us show that if (ii) does not stand, then it is also the case
for (i). Suppose 9s 2 Suppf  such that s 62 SE2RSuppf  E: Then 9p 2Ff  such
that ps > 0: BF R; p  ; since 8g 2 BF R; s 62 Suppg:
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(ii) ) (i). Let us take a p 2Ff . Consider a function u : Suppf  ! R
such that 8s 2 Suppf ; s 2 us: Define gu 2 BF R by mguE P
s2Suppf =usE ps: We obtain gu 2 BF R; p. 
We can expect (ii) to be an important consistency condition. For instance,
consider on the contrary that (ii) does not hold. Then there exists a p such that
BF R; p  ; and, according to Proposition 2.3, this means that the decision-
maker already knows that whatever g he will receive, he will not consider p as
possible any more. Logically, he could eliminate ex ante p in his initial
knowledge coref .
One may wonder what role R plays. The following results show that we can
restrict our attention to RSuppf :
Proposition 2.6. For all belief functions f and sets R; f  R  f  RSuppf :
Proof. First let us prove that f  RSuppf   f  R: For that purpose, let us
consider g belonging to BF RSuppf ; f ; and define a new belief function
gu 2 BF R; f  such that Ff ; gu Ff ; g: Thus, let u be a mapping
E 2 RSuppf  ! uE 2 R such that uE \ Suppf   E, the existence of
such a mapping is trivial from the definition of RSuppf : Furthermore, it is
straightforward that u is injective. Hence let gu be the set-function on S; 2S
whose Mobius inverse is defined by mguF   mguÿ1F ; 8F 2 2S : That gu is
a belief function with support contained in R, can be readily checked. It re-
mains to prove that Ff ; gu Ff ; g:
First prove Ff ; gu Ff ; g: Let p 2 coref  \ coregu: That p will also
belong to coreg will result through (iii) of the Lemma 2.1 from the fact that
8s 2 Suppp; 8F 2 R; one obtains F  fsg is equivalent to uÿ1F   sf g:
The converse inclusion Ff ; gu Ff ; g, will be similarly obtained
through Lemma 2.1, taking into account the fact that if p 2Ff ; g then
8s 2 Suppp; 8E 2 RSuppf , one obtains E  fsg is equivalent to uE 
fsg; hence mguuE  mgE will allow to conclude.
Conversely let us prove that f  R  f  RSuppf : For that purpose, let us
consider g belonging to BF R; f ; and define a new belief function g0
2 BF RSuppf ; f  such that Ff ; g0 Ff ; g: Thus let g0 be the set-




mgF ; 8E 2 2S :
First it is easy to show that g 2 BF R; f  entails that 8p 2Ff ; g and
8F 2 Ug; F \ Suppp 6 ; hence F \ Suppf  6 ;, and therefore: F \ Suppf 
6 ;; 8F 2 Ug: This will entail that mg0 ;  0; and that g0 is actually a belief
function whose support is contained in RSuppf : It remains to prove that
Ff ; g Ff ; g0:
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We just confine to sketch the proof of Ff ; g0 Ff ; g; the converse
being similar.
Let p 2Ff ; g0: Lemma 2.1 states that there exists a0 such that 8s 2 S :
pfsg PG022S ;G0fsg a0s;G0  mg0 G0: It follows that 8s 2 S : pfsg
PG22S ;G sf g a0s;G \ Suppf   mgG: Then for a given G 2 2S ; defining
as;G  a0s;G \ Suppf  if s belongs to G \ Suppf ; as;G  0 if s 2 G;
s 62 Suppf ; will entail through Lemma 2.1 that p P g; which achieves the
proof. 
The decision-maker is sure that there is a zero probability that the real state
of the world lies outside of Suppf , so he does not bother about these states.
Proposition 2.7. The two propositions are equivalent:
(i) For all p 2Ff ; BF RSuppf ; p is a singleton,
(ii) RSuppf  is a partition of Suppf :
Proof. (i)) (ii). Let us show that if (ii) does not hold, then it is also the case for
(i). If (ii) does not hold, then either there exists a s 2 Suppf , a p 2Ff ;E
and F in RSuppf  such that ps > 0;E 6 F and s 2 E \ F ; orS
E2RSuppf  E  Suppf  and in this case, according to Proposition 2.5, there
exists a p 2Ff  such that BF RSuppf ; p  ;: Let us consider the first
case. Then, there exists two functions uE and uF : Suppf  ! RSuppf  such
that 8s 2 Suppf ; s 2 uEs and s 2 uF s with uEs  E, uF s  F
and uEs  uF s otherwise. Define gui 2 BF RSuppf  by mgui H P
s2Suppf =uisH ps for i  E; F . Then one can check that guE 6 guF and
guE ; guF
 	  BF RSuppf ; p:
(ii) ) (i). Let us consider p 2Ff : Consider gp defined by mgpE P
s2E ps if E 2 RSuppf ;  0 otherwise. (ii) implies that gu is a belief
function in BF RSuppf ; p: Take a g 2 BF RSuppf ; p: Suppose that
g 6 gu so that there exists a E 2 RSuppf  such that mgE 6 mguE.





mguF   1:
Then with (ii) and by definition of gu, this implies that gE  mgE < guE 
mguE  pE and
gS n E 
X
F2RSuppf n Ef g
mgF 
 1ÿ mgE > guS n E
 1ÿ mguE
 pS n E
 1ÿ pE;
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which contradicts the fact that p 2 coreg. If mgE < mguE the contradic-
tion comes directly from gE  mgE > guE  mguE  pE: 
Condition (ii) is quite strong and corresponds to the particular case we have
examined in the examples. The next proposition shows that there exists some
weaker condition that still give some interesting property for the Ambiguity
Reducing Structures.
Proposition 2.8. The first two propositions are equivalent and they imply the third
one:
(i) For all p in Ff ; BF R; p 6 ; and for all p; p0 in Ff , either
BF R; p \ BF R; p0  ; or BF R; p  BF R; p0.
(ii) f  R is a partition of Ff .
(iii) For any E 2 Uf ;RE is a partition of E and for all H ;G in R, for all
E; F 2 Uf ; H \ E  G \ E and E \ F 6 ; implies H \ F  G \ F :
Proof. (i) ) (ii). Since 8p; BF R; p 6 ;; then SFf ;g2f RFf ; g Ff .
Consider two distinct g and g0 in BF R; f  such that Ff ; g \Ff ; g0 6 ;
(however, if two such g and g0 do not exist, then f  R is necessarily a partition
of Ff : Then 9p 2Ff ; g \Ff ; g0. 8p0 2Ff ; g; g 2 BF R; p
\BF R; p0 and (i) implies that g0 2 BF R; p0 and p0 2Ff ; g0: Thus
Ff ; g Ff ; g0 which means that f  R is a partition.
(ii) ) (i). Since SFf ;g2f RFf ; g Ff ; 8p 2Ff  9g such that
p 2Ff ; g showing that BF R; p 6 ;: If g 2 BF R; p \ BF R; p0 and
g0 2 BF R; p; then p 2Ff ; g \Ff ; g0 so Ff ; g Ff ; g0 and
p0 2Ff ; g ) p0 2Ff ; g0 which means that g0 2 BF R; p0:
(ii)) (iii). Let us show that if (iii) does not hold, then it is also the case for
(ii). If (iii) does not hold then we are in one of the following situations:
RE is not a partition of E for all E and
(a) either 9E 2 UF  such that SH2RE H  E which implies[
H2RSuppf 
H  Suppf 
and by Proposition 2.5 we know then that
S
Ff ;g2f RFf ; g Ff  which
contradicts (ii).
(b) Or there exist two distinct F and G in RE such that F \ G 6 ;. Suppose
F n G 6 ;. (If F n G  ;, then necessarily G n F 6 ; and we can adapt the
proof). Then there exist functions uF , uF\G : Uf  ! Suppf  and func-
tions LF , LG : Uf  ! R such that 8H 2 Uf ;uF H 2 H \ LF H,
uF\GH 2 H \ LGH, 8H 6 E; LF H  LGH; uF H  uF\GH and
uF E 2 F n G, uF\GE 2 F \ G: Define the probability distributions pi, for
i  F ; F \ G by pis 
P
H2Uf =uiHsmf H and the belief functions gi,
for i  F ;G by mgiL 
P
H2Uf =LiHL mf H. We can check that
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pF\G 2Ff ; gF  \Ff ; gG, pF 2Ff ; gF  and pF 62Ff ; gG which means
that f  R is not a partition.
Or RE is a partition of E for all E but
(c) 9H ;G in R;E; F in Uf  such that H \ E  G \ E and H \ F 6 G \ F :
Then H \ E \ F   G \ E \ F   ; according to the partition’s condition.
Suppose H \ F 6 ;: Then, there exists L 2 R such that L \ E \ F  6 ;:
Then there exists a function w : Uf  n fE; F g ! Suppf ; functions NH ,
NG : Uf  ! R such that 8M 2 Uf  n fE; F g;NH M  NGM and NHE 
H ;NGE  G;NH F   NGF   L; and states s 2 H \ E; sH 2 H \ F ;
sL 2 L \ E \ F : Define the probability distributions pi, for i  H ;G by
8s 2 S n s; sH ; sLf g; pis 
P
P2Uf nfE;F g=wP s mf P ,
pH s 
X
P2Uf nfE;F g=wP s
mf P ;















pGsL  mf F  
X
P2Uf nfE;F g=wP s
mf P ;
and belief functions gi, for i  H ;G by mgiM 
P
P2Uf =NiP M mf P :
We can check that pG 2Ff ; gH \Ff ; gG; pH 2Ff ; gH  and
pH 62Ff ; gG which means that f  R is not a partition. 
This partitional case is similar to the usual information structures conceived
as partitions of 2 S. Example 1.2 was a case were condition (iii) is satisfied. This
result shows that in general, f  R is not a partition of Ff  and that the
ambiguity reduction process can be itself quite fuzzy.
3. The information value of an ambiguity reducing structure
We consider the Max min EU with multi-prior model of [6] in order to
analyse the value of information. Let us introduce this model of preference
formally. The decision-maker is choosing between acts a which are mappings
2 We conjecture that (iii) is also a sucient condition to have a partition.
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from S into a set of outcomes X . We suppose that the decision-maker has a
utility function U defined on X and that his preference on the set of acts relies
on a family Ff  of probability distributions on S, with f his initial belief
function, through the functional
Vf a  min
p2Ff 
EpUa:
Without access to supplementary statistical data, the timing of decision and
resolution of uncertainty is shown in Fig. 1.
Let us denote a as the optimal choice of the decision-maker when he has to
choose in an opportunity set A and V A; f   maxa2A Vf a  Vf a the op-
timal value he can get.
However, after he receives a g 2 BF R; f , the decision-maker chooses ac-
cording to his ‘‘revised’’ preference Vf\g. The timing of decision and reso-
lution of uncertainty is shown in Fig. 2.
Let us denote a  g his optimal choice after he receives the belief function g
and V A; f \ g  maxa2A Vf\ga  Vf\ga  g the optimal value he gets
conditionally on g. How does the decision-maker value ex ante the whole
process of choosing in A after getting new statistical data? For that, we have to
determine how the decision-maker evaluates ex ante the fact of getting
V A; f \ g conditionally on g. Since the decision-maker’s anticipations about
the g’s 2 BF R; f  he may receive are totally uncertain, it seems natural to
consider the following anticipated value:
V A; f ;R  min
g2BF R;f 
V A; f \ g:
We will say that there is a positive value of information for the structure f  R
if the anticipated value V A; f ;R is greater than the value V A; f  he would get
by ignoring his information possibilities.
Fig. 1. No information.
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Definition 3.1. The information value is equal to
VIA; f ;R  V A; f ;R ÿ V A; f :
Since 8E 2 Uf ;RE 6 f;g; hence BF R; f  6 ; and the information value
is well defined.
The next results confirm the intuition that the reduction of ambiguity is
positive for the decision-maker, i.e., the information value is always positive. 3
Theorem 3.1. For all A; f and R; VIA; f ;RP 0:
Proof. 8g 2 BF R; f ;Ff ; g Ff  ) 8a 2 A; V A; f \ g  maxa2A Vf\ga
P Vf a. So, V A; f \ gP V A; f : Consequently, V A; f ;R  ming2BF R;f 
V A; f \ gP V A; f : 
4. Consistent ambiguity reducing structure
We noted that Proposition 2.5 was about some logical consistency between
the anticipation and the initial knowledge. Another way to introduce this idea
of consistency between the anticipation and the initial knowledge is to consider
the following notion of Neutrality with respect to initial knowledge.
Definition 4.1. f  R satisfies Neutrality with respect to the initial knowledge
Ff  if Ff   Sg2BF R;f Ff ; g:
Thus, we can complete Proposition 2.5.
Fig. 2. With information.
3 This positive result does not contradict the well-known result that standard ‘‘focusing’’
information might have a negative-value in non-Bayesian models.
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Proposition 4.1. The three propositions are equivalent:
(i) For all p 2Ff ; BF R; p 6 ;;
(ii)
S
E2RSuppf  E  Suppf ;
(iii) f  R satisfies Neutrality with respect to the initial knowledge Ff :
Proof. Proposition 2.5 stated the equivalence between (i) and (ii).
(i) ) (iii). Since 8p 2Ff ; 9g 2 BF R; f  such that p 2Ff ; g;
Ff   Sg2BF R;f Ff ; g
(iii) ) (i). 8p 2Ff ; 9g 2 BF R; f  such that p 2Ff ; g: h
Neutrality with respect to the initial knowledge captures the idea that the
anticipation in an ambiguity reducing structure should not allow the decision-
maker to improve ex ante his knowledge.
Let us take now a decision theoretic point of view. A positive value of in-
formation captures the decision theorists intuition that information is always
valuable because it permits to adapt more accurately one’s choice. Yet if the
choice set is reduced to a unique act, there is no possibility of adjusting more
accurately one’s choice and there should be a null value of information
whatever is the information structure. If on the contrary, we find a positive
value of information, it is the kind of ‘‘pure’’ value of information that indi-
cates that the initial knowledge does not capture all the information already
available in the information structure. What is the condition that ensures that
we will not find a pure value of information? The following theorem shows that
the consistency conditions examined above are the right conditions.
Theorem 4.1. The two propositions are equivalent:
(i) f  R satisfies Neutrality with respect to the initial knowledge Ff .
(ii) For any singleton A; VIA; f ;R  0.
Proof. (i) ) (ii). Since A  fag














 V A; f :
(ii)) i. Let us show that if (i) does not stand, then it is also the case for (ii).
By Proposition 4.1, there is a s 2 Suppf  n SE2RSuppf  E. Consider A  fag
with a such that Uas  a and 8s 6 sUas  b; a < b. (We assume the
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non-degeneracy of X in order to allow the construction of such an act a.) Then,
since 8p 2 SFf ;g2f RFf ; g; ps  0 it implies that EpUa  V A; f ;R  b.
On the other hand, since 9p 2Ff  such that ps > 0; V A; f  < b and thus
VIA; f ;R > 0: 
5. Comparing ambiguity reducing structures
It is interesting to be able to compare ambiguity reducing structures in terms
of informativeness. One way to do that, is to compare their respective values of
information. Let us adapt the classical definition of [1].
Definition 5.1. f  R is more informative than f  R if for all A,
VIA; f ;RP VIA; f ;R:
Our purpose is to find some equivalent comparative properties of the am-
biguity reducing structures. Let us introduce the following two definitions.
Definition 5.2. f  R is finer than f  R if for all g 2 BF R; f  there exists a
g 2 BF R; f  such that Ff ; g Ff ; g:
Definition 5.3. R is Uf -finer than the set R if for all E 2 Uf ; for all
F 2 RE; there exists a G 2 RE such that F  G:
The following result gives the complete characterization of the partial or-
dering for the ambiguity reducing structures.
Theorem 5.1. The three propositions are equivalent:
(i) f  R is more informative than f  R,
(ii) f  R is finer than f  R,
(iii) R is Uf -finer than the set R.
Proof. (i)) (iii). Let us show that if (iii) does not hold, then it is also the case
for (i). Then, there exists E 2 Uf  and F 2 R such that 8G 2 R;E \ F is not
included in E \ G: First,we show that there exists a g 2 BF R; f  such that
8g 2 BF R; f ;Ff ; g is not included in Ff ; g: There exists a function
u : Uf  ! R such that 8H 2 Uf ;H \ uH 6 ;;uH  F if H \ E \ F 
6 ;: Define g 2 BF R; f  by 8G 2 R mgG 
P
H2Uf =uHG mf H: (Indeed,
one can check that g is compatible with f.) Consider g 2 BF R; f . According
to Lemma 2.2, there exists a mapping b : 2S  2S ! R verifying Lemma 2.2
condition (ii). There exists a G 2 R such that bE;G > 0 and a s 2 S
such that s 2 E \ F  n E \ F \ G: Then define a p 2Ff ; g such that
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p sf g   PH2R=H sf g mgH: (Indeed, such a p exists.) By definition of g, we
have also pfsg PH2Uf =H sf g mf H. Let us check that p 62Ff ; g. If p
were in Ff ; g; we should have
pfsg6
X














which entails a contradiction.
Thus 8g 2 BF R; f ; there exists a p 2Ff ; g with p 62Ff ; g: Let
a; b 2 R2 such that a < b: Since Ff ; g is a closed convex set there exists
(Minkowski lemma) an hyperplan H in Rn going through p and with Ff ; g
above H. Let u be a normal to H: Consider
u0  bÿ a
infp2Ff ;g u  p ÿ u  p
 
 u
 a  infp2Ff ;g u  p
ÿ ÿ b  u  p
infp2Ff ;g u  p ÿ u  p
 
 e;
where e is the unit vector of Rn. Since we consider probability distributions, we
have that u0  p  a < infp2Ff ;g u0  p  b: Let ag be an act such that
Uag  u0: So u0  p  EpUag  a and Vf\g ag  b. Let us consider
such an ag for all g 2 BF R; f  and A  fag=g 2 BF R; f g. Then
V A; f ;R6 V A; f \ g6 a while 8g 2 BF R; f 
V A; f \ gP Vf\g ag  b
and thus V A; f ;RP b. Since VIA; f ;R ÿ VIA; f ;R  V A; f ;R
ÿ V A; f ;R6 aÿ b < 0; we have exhibited a decision problem where it is
better to be informed according to f  R:
(iii) ) (ii). Consider g 2 BF R; f : There exists a mapping u : P  fE; F 
2 Uf   R=E \ F 6 ;g ! R such that 8E; F  2 P;E \ F  E \ uE; F :
According to Lemma 2.2, there exists a mapping b : 2S  2S ! R verifying
condition (ii) of Lemma 2.2. Define the mapping b : 2S  2S ! R by bE;G
PF2R=uE;F G bE; F  and consider g defined by mg G PE2Uf  bE;G:
By definition of u and Lemma 2.2, we have g 2 BF R; f . One can check
using Lemma 2.1 that Ff ; g Ff ; g showing (ii).
(ii) ) (i). Let us note that VIA; f ;R ÿ VIA; f ;R  V A; f ;Rÿ
V A; f ;R: Since 8g 2 BF R; f ; 9g 2 BF R; f  such that Ff ; g 
Ff ; g; then 8a 2 A;minp2Ff ;g EpUaP minp2Ff ;g EpUa, so
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V A; f \ gP V A; f \ gP V A; f ;R
and finally V A; f ;RP V A; f ;R: 
Note that in the particular case where R is a partition of S (see Example 1.1),
the ambiguity reducing structure is more informative if and only if the partition
is finer.
6. Concluding remarks
As emphasized in Section 1, in this paper we confine ourselves to initial
imprecise probabilities situations described by belief functions, assuming
moreover that ex ante the decision-maker is merely informed of the set R of
possible focal events of a future compatible belief function. This allows us to
derive in an easy way a simple characterization of such a compatible ambiguity
reducing process (see Proposition 2.4). Furthermore this leads, in the frame-
work of the multiple-priors model, both to confirm the intuition of the posi-
tiveness of ambiguity reduction (see Theorem 3.1), and to obtain a neat and
meaningful characterization of the partial ordering ‘‘more informative than’’,
in terms of fineness of ‘‘information R’’.
Assuming that ex ante information consists of a set R of possible focal el-
ements may appear as a limitation, as can be shown by examining, for instance,
some practical examples of opinion surveys. It will be the objective of a future
paper to relax this assumption, the same will apply to the belief function
hypothesis.
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